CSG CYBER DEFENSE EDUCATION & RESEARCH FOUNDATION
CSG CYBER DEFENSE EDUCATION & RESEARCH FOUNDATION
Adversaries may exploit remote services (such as Modbus/OPC-UA servers or engineering gateway interfaces) to gain unauthorized access to ICS systems or pivot across OT networks.
Not specified in official MITRE record
Inspect deep OT protocol telemetry (Modbus TCP, DNP3, S7comm) for anomalous source IPs connecting outside normal engineering windows.
Leveraged direct IEC 104 / IEC 61850 / OPC DA protocol communications to manipulate electrical substation switchgear.
Isolate Level 0–2 ICS process control zones behind unidirectional gateways or industrial DMZ firewalls from corporate IT networks.
Enforce explicit role-based authorization on engineering workstations and PLC key-switches (RUN vs PROGRAM mode) to reject unauthorized remote logic downloads.
Exploiting exposed industrial protocols or HMI gateways bridging corporate IT networks into physical OT controller subnets.
Many legacy PLCs accept unauthenticated protocol packets if an attacker reaches their VLAN.
Enforce strict Purdue Model DMZ segmentation (M0930) so IT systems can never send raw industrial packets to Level 1 PLCs.
Distinguishes authoritative MITRE ATT&CK STIX specifications from CSG Cyber School educational study material.
CSG educational commentary separated explicitly from official MITRE ATT&CK documentation.